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My task is to examine the use of force in bloc situations and to
discover, if possible, whether there are "rules of the game," or norms
of international law, which govern such use. In analyzing the question,
two incidents will be examined in particular-the United States use of
force in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Soviet use of force
against Czechoslovakia in 1968. From a study of these two incidents,
as well as others not presently under examination, it appears that a
pattern is developing.
It will be necessary in this context to employ the word "intervention"
frequently; hence, it should be mentioned at the outset that the word
"intervention" will be used to describe the phenomenon of international
life in which a state sends military men and materiel across another
state's boundaries.' This use of the word is not to imply that intervention
of this nature is the only kind that exists or matters; rather, it implies
that such intervention is the only kind congruent with the use of force
in bloc situations. This type of intervention is not only the most trau-
matic for the international system, but illustrates with the greatest lucid-
ity and forcefulness what appears to be the development of a rule gov-
erning the use of force in bloc situations.
Since the Second World War, both the Soviet Union and the United
States have engaged in intervention on a somewhat continual basis.
Many different methods of intervention, including economic aid, sub-
version, propaganda, nonrecognition, expression of moral support, as
well as direct military assault, have been implemented at one time or
another. In accordance with its own interests and ideological commit-
ments, each of the two nations has cast opprobrium on the other for
*Professor of Government, Florida State University.
'One author has defined intervention as "the attempt by one state to affect the internal structure
and external behavior of other states through various degrees of coercion ..... Beloff,
Reflections on Intervention, 22 J. INT'L ArF. 198 (1968).
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engaging in the "shameful and illegal" practice of intervention, thus
equating all intervention with immorality. The Soviet Union, in Ameri-
can eyes, has used unwarranted pressures to install and maintain re-
gimes which free peoples repudiate. From the Soviet viewpoint, the
United States has practiced intervention, even to the extent of using
military force, to support or restore "reactionary" regimes and to
retard the progressive course of history. It must be recognized that the
two superpowers presently are doing no more than nations before them
have done throughout the course of history. The posture of each is sound
in the sense that it is unreasonable in the light of history to suggest that
a great power should not use its strength to further the cause it has at
heart-its so-called national interest. However, wanton use of power for
the futherance of whimsical pursuits of national interests is disturbingly
dangerous, and one could not, without difficulty, defend the use of
power in such a pattern as serving the best interest of either the interven-
ing power or the host state.2
The present speaker has recently completed an analysis in which he
contends that distinct types of forceful intervention clearly emerge.3
That clearly defined political patterns are emerging with respect to the
use of force, however, does not necessarily mean that there is currently
a clearly developed system of international law on the subject. Political
patterns nevertheless tend to translate themselves into norms of law, and
a study of the political patterns may help us identify the future legal
norms governing the use of force.
The real world is one in which sovereignty and the closely related
doctrine of nonintervention are beginning to undergo transformation.
To view, in the seventh decade of the twentieth century, the nation-state
as independent, self-sufficient, and owing obedience to no other com-
munity is not only unrealistic, but dangerous folly. The doctrine of
nonintervention is in serious need of reevaluation. Nations in positions
of leadership find it difficult to observe, because they cannot do so and
at the same time expect to offer leadership.4 This is especially true in
bloc situations, as will be shown in the following analysis.
'in this connection, Beloff speaks of the law of "comparative risk": "[I]t is unwise to intervene
where the risk involved entails an even greater evil than the one the intervention is intended to
prevent." Id. at 202.
3R. OGLESBY, INTERNAL WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR NORMATIVE ORDER (1971).
'See Henkin, International Legal Order and Management of World Order in 2 THE STRATEGY
OF WORLD ORDER 335, 344 (3d ed. R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz 1966). See also Scott,
Nonintervention and Conditional Intervention, 22 J. INT'L AFF. 208, 209 (1968).
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UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1965)
United States Marines landed at Santo Domingo on April 28, 1965.1
Justification for the action was based on the need to protect the lives of
American and foreign nationals. The "Three Colonels," whose claims
to be the legitimate government of the Republic were somewhat ambig-
uous, found their forces hard put in battle and sent word to Washington
that they were no longer able to protect Americans and other foreign
nationals. At that juncture the United States dispatched Marines and
claimed that intervention was justified on humanitarian grounds, a
claim which for a considerable period of time has enjoyed legitimacy.'
A few days later, after most Americans and other foreign nationals
had been evacuated, a further justification was required for the contin-
ued deployment of American Forces. It was claimed that that which had
begun as a democratic revolution had fallen into the hands of commu-
nist conspirators7 and that American troops were needed to prevent a
communist take-over.
Still later, another justification was introduced, which, for purposes
of this paper, was much more informative. It was asserted that the
action of the United States in sending military forces into the Domini-
can Republic was designed to implement the resolutions of the Organi-
zation of American States (O.A.S.) and to permit the situation in the
Dominican Republic to be dealt with on a regional basis. The Tenth
Meeting of the Consultation of the O.A.S. ratified this claim despite
a vigorous challenge on the grounds that it was ex post facto.' At the
same time, the O.A.S. established an Inter-American Peace Force
amidst criticism that the forces composing it were primarily from the
United States.
Some who accepted the action of the United States Marines as essen-
tially regional were critical of the failure on the part of the United States
or the O.A.S. to abide by the requirements of article 53 of the United
Nations Charter, which in essence forbids regional enforcement action
except under the authority of the United Nations. But Leonard Meeker,
Legal Adviser for the Department of State, offered a rebuttal to that
'For an informative background on the political situation in the Dominican Republic during the
several months preceding the intervention by the United States, see R. BARNET, INTERVENTION
AND REVOLUTION 153-80 (1968).
'Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser for the Department of State, considered that articles 15 and
17 of the O.A.S. Charter forbidding intervention did not prevent the use of United States troops
in.the Dominican Republic for humanitarian purposes. See Meeker, The Dominican Situation in
the Perspective of International Law, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 60 (1965).
'See Draper, The Dominican Crisis, 40 COMMENTARY 33, 37 (Dec. 1965).
'See Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order,
44 DEN. L.J. 225, 241-42 (1967).
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position. He said, "There should be no doctrinaire assumption that the
United Nations and its Security Council are the exclusive guardians of
world peace. In fact, the United Nations and the OAS," he continued,
"are mutually reinforcing. '
THE AMERICAN FORMULATION OF THE RULE ON THE USE OF FORCE IN
BLOC SITUATIONS: THE JOHNSON DOCTRINE
Professor Richard Barnet ends his otherwise perceptive chapter on
the Dominican intervention by quoting a paragraph from President
Johnson's Baylor Unitersity speech of 1965:
The first reality is that old concepts and old labels are largely obso-
lete. In today's world, with enemies of freedom talking about "Wars
of national liberation," the old distinction between "Civil War" and
"International War" has already lost much of its meaning. . . . The
moment of decision must become the moment of action.
Professor Barnet then makes the observation that "[tihis is the essence
of the Johnson Doctrine-a virtually unlimited claim for legitimacy for
armed intervention in civil strife."' 10 This is hardly a realistic assessment
of President Johnson's intentions or of the realities of American foreign
policy.
A close examination of the President's speech shows a much more
narrow claim than Barnet's analysis would imply. The President was
asserting the right of a bloc leader to use force on behalf of the bloc in
intrabloc situations. The doctrinal defense for bloc interventions was
enunciated by President Johnson in the same speech referred to by
Barnet some four weeks after United States military intervention in the
Dominican Republic. The President pointed out that the United States
was a member of the O.A.S. and in that capacity had assumed a com-
mon responsibility for dealing with communist infiltration into the
Western Hemisphere. The United States acted unilaterally because of
time pressures, but it acted on behalf of the O.A.S., and it later invited
troops from other O.A.S. nations to join the action. The President saw
significance in the fact that "for the first time in the history of the
Organization of American States [it] . . . sent to the soil of an Ameri-
can nation an international peacekeeping military force."" Its contin-
ued presence there guaranteed to the Dominican people true self-
determination as long as such self-determination was within the context
'Meeker, supra note 6.
"BARNET, supra note 5 at 181.
"The text of the President's speech is reprinted in N.Y. Times, May 29, 1965, at 2, col. 2.
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of bloc requirements. A basic bloc requirement, as set forth in the Punte
del Este Resolution, was that there shall be no communist take-over in
the Western Hemisphere. The President assured the Dominican people
that "we intend to work for self-determination of the peoples of the
Americas within the framework of freedom.''
When the Security Council considered the Dominican situation in
July 1965, l1 the Soviet Union denied the validity of all claims put
forward by the United States. The Soviets charged the United States
with flagrant violation of articles 2(4) and 53 of the United Nations
Charter. The claim of the United States that it acted on behalf of and
for the interests of the O.A.S. was also attacked by the Soviets, who
argued that article 34 of the Charter places responsibility for the mainte-
nance of peace in the hands of the Security Council. According to article
30, it was contended, the Security Council is also the only organ compe-
tent to determine the existence of a threat to the peace and the measures
to be taken in response thereto.
The Soviets also argued that article 51 was applicable only if there is
an armed attack against a member of the Organization and if the Secu-
rity Council has not acted. It was further the Soviet position that the
situation in the Dominican Republic did not fall within the provisions
of article 51.14 Even among American scholars there was disagreement
on whether or not United States action in the Dominican Republic was
in the interest of peacekeeping, as the U.S. claimed, or was enforcement
action, as charged by the Russians, and thus subject to the U.N. Charter
provisions and restraints. This disagreement cannot be settled conclu-
sively since there is neither a third-party procedure for assessing the
facts nor, for that matter, any clear distinction between peacekeeping
and enforcement. 5
Despite the strong objections raised by the Soviets and the heated
rhetoric which they used to indict the United States for violations of
Charter provisions, the lesson to be learned from the American use of
regional authority as justification for the use of force in bloc situations
was not lost. Reliance on regional support had not been available to the
Soviets during the Hungarian revolt of 1956, but they had learned the
12!d.
1
3For a report of the debates, see Security Council, Report, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2, at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/6302 (1965).
"See Note, Soviet and American Attitudes Toward Intervention, II VA. J. INT'L L. 97 (1970).
"
5 For a discussion of this point and an attempt to set up a definition which would aid in making
a distinction, see Moore, The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order,
in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (C. Black &
R. Falk ed. 1970).
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Dominican lesson well by the time of their decision to use force in
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE ON BLOC INTERVENTION
The facts of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 are too
well known to need elaboration here. Soviet justification turned on a
socialist definition of self-determination, which permitted that principle
to be applied only within the context of socialism. The U.S.S.R. had
already demonstrated its unwillingness to permit a bloc nation to de-
viate from the bloc when in 1956 it intervened and prevented Hungary
from taking a neutralist stance. A decade after the Hungarian crisis,
Czechoslovakia showed signs of being attracted by overtures of the
West, made especially appealing by promises of economic properity and
more political freedom.
In the fall of 1967, Czechoslovakian students protested and demanded
reforms within the state, including more autonomy from Russia. Presi-
dent Antonin Novotny was forced out of office by popular discontent,
and Alexander Dubcek was elected to fill Novotny's position as Com-
munist Party Secretary." Various measures were taken by the Russians
to warn the Czechoslovakians that the reforms were unacceptable,
even though the Warsaw Pact members met with representatives from
Czechoslovakia in Bratislava and appeared to have accepted the re-
forms. Soviet troops, along with contingents of other Warsaw Pact
troops, invaded various points of the nation in August of 1968. Czech
troops offered no resistance, and within the course of a year the nation
was brought back within the bloc.
Rationalization for the Soviet invasion appeared in Pravda on Sep-
tember 26, 1968, over the signature of Sergei Kovalyov, although the
doctrine which the Pravda statement advanced is attributed to Leonid
Brezhnev, Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The
statement is worth quoting somewhat extensively since the "law" on the
use of force in bloc situations was clearly enunciated for the first time
as a basis for the legality of intervention. The interventions both in the
Dominican Republic and in Hungary had been borne up on the old rule
that intervention is permissible when invited by the incumbent govern-
ment. In both cases this rule was a rather weak reed for support since
both the Kadar government in Hungary and the government of the
"Three Colonels" in the Dominican Republic were of doubtful legiti-
macy. Since even this weak reed was not applicable to the Czechoslova-
"EU. SCHWARZ, CONFRONTATION AND INTERVENTION IN THE MODERN WORLD 147 (1970).
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kian intervention, Brezhnev set forth a different legal justification:
The socialist states respect the democratic norms of international
law. They have proved this more than once in practice, by coming out
resolutely against the attempts of imperialism to violate the sover-
eignty and independence of nations. It is from these same positions
that they reject the leftist, adventurist conception of "exporting revolu-
tion," of "bringing happiness" to other peoples. However, from a
Marxist point of view, the norms of law, including the norms of mutual
relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly,
formally, and in isolation from the general context of class struggle in
the modern world. The socialist countries resolutely come out against
the exporting and importing of counterrevolution ...
Each Communist party is free to apply the basic principles of
Marxism-Leninism and of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart
from these principles [(]assuming, naturally, that it remains a Com-
munist party).
Concretely, this means, first of all, that, in its activity, each Com-
munist party cannot but take into account such a decisive fact of our
time as the struggle between two opposing social systems-capitalism
and socialism ...
It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist country sems [sic]
to adopt a "non-affiliated" stand, it retains its national independence,
in effect, precisely because of the might of the socialist community,
and above all the Soviet Union as a central force, which also includes
the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links in
the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries,
which cannot look indifferently upon this. .... 1
The Brezhnev and Johnson doctrines introduced a new concept of
limited sovereignty of nations within a bloc, and asserted the right of
the bloc leader to intervene even to the point of using force where the
situation threatens to remove the target nation from the orbit of the
bloc. Urs Schwarz thinks that the Nixon (or Guam) doctrine, an-
nounced by the President first at a press conference in Guam in July
1969, and later expanded in his State of the Union message of January
22, 1970, may furnish the basis for reducing the incidence of interven-
tions in the future. In the doctrine the President asserted that developing
nations which had formerly leaned on the United States to assume full
responsibility for their defense must rely more on themselves. Schwarz
may be correct in his assumption that the Nixon doctrine may be instru-
mental in reducing global interventions on the part of the United States,
"Translated and reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1323 (1968). Another translation appears
in N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. I.
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but it is hardly likely in the present climate of international relations
that bloc interventions or use of force in intrabloc situations will be
reduced. 5
ROLE OF REGIONALISM IN DOMINICAN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INTER-
VENTION
Both the Soviet Union and the United States denied the charges of
unilaterialism in the actions just discussed. For a great power like the
United States to overwhelm a small country like the Dominican Repub-
lic or for the Soviet Union to overcome Czechoslovakia clearly involves
no major logistical problem. Yet both nations took great pains to clothe
their respective operations with the more community-accepted standard
of collective action. The object, of course, was to give their actions legal
coloration. Unilateral action by a single state unless in self-defense is
incontestably illegal. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is clear
on the point. Similar clarity does not exist, however, when the use of
force is undertaken collectively and in the name of a regional organiza-
tion.
The matter of the Dominican intervention came before the Security
Council on July 20 and 26, 1965, with the Soviet Union insisting that
the O.A.S. had exceeded its authority by using the Inter-American
Peace Force. Russia argued that under article 39 of the Charter the
Security Council had sole responsibility for determining threats to the
peace and appropriate measures to be taken in response. 9 The Soviet
Union denied that article 51 permits armed force by separate states or
groups of states, except where armed attack has occurred against a
member of the United Nations. The Soviet delegate insisted that the
situation in the Dominican Republic did not conform to the set of facts
necessary to trigger action under article 51.
The United States countered with the argument that the landing of
American troops was consistent with article 52 of the Charter whereby
a regional agency is permitted to deal on its own with matters relating
to the maintenance of international peace and security; thus, American
forces, and later the Inter-American Peace Force, were not engaging in
an enforcement action under article 51 which would require approval
by the Security Council.20
"gScHwARz, supra note 16, at 151-53.
"Security Council, supra note 13.
"*Professor Moore has suggested a way of deteimining the difference between enforcement and
peacekeeping functions: "If the purpose of the force is to restore orderly processes of self-
determination and is not simply to render assistance to one side or another in an internal conflict,
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The Soviet Union defended its use of force against Czechoslovakia
by claiming that under article 2(7) of the Charter, the. Security Council
could not deal with the "internal affairs" of Czechoslovakia. The inter-
vention did not fall within the interdiction of article 2(4), the Soviets
contended, since no provision of the Charter condemns collective self-
defense as interference; the intervention of the Socialist countries did
not impinge on either the "territorial integrity" or the "political inde-
pendence" of Czechoslovakia, hence article 2(4) was not apposite." But
a majority of the members of the General Assembly in 1965 considered
the Soviet Union in violation both of the Charter and of international
law.
Critics of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia denied that the Warsaw
Pact intervention was consistent with either the principles or the spirit
of the Charter. For the maintenance of peace and security article 52 of
the Charter admittedly permits the existence of regional agencies and
arrangements to the extent that they are "consistent with the Purpose
and Principles of the United Nations." It was felt at the time, however,
that the Soviet action was in willful disregard of article 2(4), forbidding
aggressive use of force, and of the principles of the United Nations. 22
The role of the regional (bloc) organization vis-a-vis the Security
Council remains ambiguous, despite the best attempts of international
lawyers the world over to define the relationship. The Dominican inter-
vention raised the question of whether the regional organization or the
Security Council had the competence to act. In connection with the
Czechoslovakian intervention the Soviet argument was that only the
Warsaw Pact could authorize responsive action, since only Socialist
countries were involved. The practice of states, however, is relatively
clear. The principle of self-determination cannot be tolerated to the
degree that a bloc nation will be permitted to deviate from the bloc;
revolutions which have as their objective the severance of a nation from
bloc allegiance will invite quick intervention by the bloc under the lead-
ership of the major bloc power. There would appear to be nothing in
the so-called Nixon Doctrine 23 which invalidates this conclusion from
the American viewpoint. A fair interpretation of that statement is that
it disclaims unilateralism on the part of the United States. But there is
then there would seem to be a good case for saying that such action is not directed against a state
and is thus not an enforcement action." Moore, supra note 15, at 54.
215 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, No. 8, at 46-47 (1968).
"For a criticism of the Soviet intervention, see Goodman, The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 1968,
4 INT'L LAWYER 42 (1969); and Reis, Legal Aspects of the Invasion and Occupation of
Czechoslovakia, 59 DEP'T STATE BULL. 394, 397 (1968).
2"See p. 83 supra.
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an affirmation that "we shall be faithful to our treaty commitment,"
and one would suppose this faithfulness encompasses the Rio Pact as
well as its commitment to prevent a Communist takeover in Latin
America.
CONCLUSION: IDEOLOGY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN BLOC SITUATIONS
In the twenty-five years of the existence of the United Nations, there
have been some one hundred separate outbreaks of hostility between
states. 4 Only in the Korean conflict, and then by a fortuitous circum-
stance, has the United Nations been able to take effective enforcement
action. It therefore comes as no surprise to discover that states have
turned to regional alliances for the preservation of their integrity. As
ideological differences eroded the effectiveness of chapter VII of the
Charter, states found articles 51, 52, and 53 to be legal justification for
the use of various kinds of collective force, where ideological uniformity
formed an effective basis for action. Regional organizations (blocs) have
come to interpret articles 52 and 53, particularly, as legitimating the use
of force in bloc interests and especially as giving primacy to the bloc in
settling disputes among its own numbers. At the present time one may
safely conclude that the Security Council has been effectively excluded
from exercising jurisdiction over disputes in which one member of a
regional organization is being forcibly purged of ideological "deviation-
ism" by the rest of the bloc members. 5
Other facts of modern international life permit one to predict with
some assurance that intervention in situations that this writer describes
as wars of social change will continue. Under the balance-of-power
system which prevailed until the beginning of World War I, noninterfer-
ence, national sovereignty, and independence represented basic, sys-
temic needs .2 In the loose, bipolar international system that developed
after World War II, there are at least two major-power blocs and a
number of regional organizations, as well as a group of uncommitted
nations called neutralists. The blocs tend to be "permanent" because
they are based upon long-term interests rather than short-term needs
which characterized the balance-of-power system. The motives which
required limited objectives under the balance-of-power system no longer
prevail, and the norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of other
nations is largely inoperative. Interdependence within the bloc gives
2
'Franck: Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 A.J.I.L. 809, 811 (1970).
"
5For an interesting discussion of the derogation of the validity of article 2(4) in intrabloc
situations, see id. at 822.2
'The terminology employed here is taken from M. KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS (1957).
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positive motivation for intervention, and concentration of capabilities
within the two leading bloc powers appears to make their role as inter-
venors inevitable. Major bloc powers find it desirable to prevent other
nations from using force, as in the Suez Crisis of 1956, but they find it
impossible to abstain from the use of force themselves. The major power
within a bloc will undoubtedly protect its interests by intervening when
necessary to regulate matters within its own bloc. Such an intervention
may be propagandized by the leading nations of an opposing bloc, but
they likely will not actively interfere since occasions may arise for inter-
vening within their own blocs to protect similar interests.
International law, like other legal orders, is responsive to social needs
and conditions. The practice of states ultimately becomes a normative
rule of law if the practice is persistent enough. One legal pattern, if not
yet a norm, is clearly delineated in the Johnson and Brezhnev doctrines.
Simply stated, the pattern is one of bloc intervention to prevent any
social and political alterations in the governmental structure of a bloc
member that might result in the loss of that member from the bloc.
Inferentially, this means that the bloc (region) has assumed the responsi-
bility of policing its own membership. Since the major bloc power
usually makes the decision to intervene and provides in largest part the
military personnel and materiel, the intervention appears to be unilat-
eral. More optimistically, however, and perhaps euphemistically, one
might use the terminology "regional interventions" or "interventions
under regional authority." Both the Brezhnev justification and the John-
son speech at Baylor entered disclaimers of unilateral action based on
narrow national interests. The Czechoslovakian intervention was under-
taken under the guise of Warsaw Pact policy; the American intervention
in the Dominican Republic, under the cloak of O.A.S. interests.
The rationale for the assumption that a pattern of bloc intervention
will continue for the foreseeable future, at least until the world's great
ideological rift is mitigated, has already been touched upon. That as-
sumption results among other things from the organized relationships
which have cemented blocs together totally, unlike the loose alliance
systems under the old balance-of-power arrangement. Contemporary
blocs are bound together not only by a common ideology, but by joint
military-command and supply facilities. They have developed long-
range functional plans, including arrangements for joint defense and the
exchange of manpower and materiel. While such arrangements within
the bloc compromise the independence of the bloc components, they do
contribute to the stability of the international system. On the other
hand, a nation within the geographic propinquity of a bloc, but socially
and politically disoriented from the other bloc nations, constitutes ipso
19721
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facto a threat to the peace. Illustrations are the presence of Communist
Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, of South Africa in the ambit of the
Organization of African Unity, not to mention Israel in the area of the
Pan-Arab world.
Georg Schwarzenberger, writing under the umbra of the 1956 Suez
crisis, not only foresaw a bloc law of intervention, but justified it as
system-serving-as a useful element of the peacekeeping operation. 7 He
argued that to classify bloc (hegemonial) intervention as purely self-
serving was to take too narrow a view of the process. He felt that there
is at least a grain of truth in the assertion that interventions of such a
nature are in fact in the interests of world peace. While the nuclear
stalemate lasts, each side, by keeping its own bloc house in order (the
pun was inevitable), "makes its own indispensible contribution to the
maintenance of world peace."28
If the above analysis is correct, one might safely predict that blocs
and regions will tend to increase in number and in strength. Their peace-
keeping activities will increase in number and importance. Unilateral-
ism in bloc situations will tend to disappear, although the bloc leader
must assume the initiative (and at times that initiative may be difficult
to distinguish from unilateralism). The legal justification for bloc inter-
ventions and intrabloc use of force will be clothed in the language of
regional commitments. A rationale that supports regional action is
being developed with reference to articles 52 and 53 of the United
Nations Charter.
When a state attempts to pull out of its bloc and when there is some
evidence, or even strong suspicion, that the reasons for it arise from the
machinations of the opposing bloc, then there is considerable certainty
that force will be used to keep that nation within the bloc. In that
situation, the opposing bloc will make the empty gesture of condemning
the other as acting illegally, but will do little more. Viewed from the
standpoint of the international system as a whole, the development of a
bloc law of interventionary force is system-serving. It will tend to main-
tain order and stability in an area of the world where balkanization, if
allowed to develop, would increase the potential for crisis situations.
"See Schwarzenberger, Hegemonial Intervention, 13 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 236 (1959).
28Id. at 261.
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